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ABSTRACT 
About 8000 fishers are operating today in the Lake Nasser’s fishery (Egypt) and the annual official 
landing varies between 12,000 and 15,000 tons. Despite this relatively modest importance, the Egyptian 
authority decided to embark in a reform of the Lake Nasser fishery in the early 2000s. The objective of 
the present article is to analyze the evolution of this reform. For this, we use a political economy 
perspective. Our analysis shows that, while some major institutional changes have undeniably resulted 
from the reform, those have little to do with a ‘liberalisation’ as conventionally understood in neo-
classical literature. Instead, the new status quo that resulted from the reorganization of the fishery turns 
out to be one where the central government and its parastatal agencies have managed to maintain their 
existing advantages. This failure to reform the system led the fishers and fish traders to develop a massive 
parallel smuggling ‘industry’ (black market) which trades a substantial amount of fish through unofficial 
channels.    
* This research has been supported through the project “Improved fisheries productivity and management 
in tropical reservoirs” funded by the Challenge Programme on Water and Food. The opinions expressed 
here remain, however, those of the authors and do not necessary reflect the view of the Challenge 
Programme, nor those of the authors’ employers. 
Keywords: Small-scale fisheries, Governance, Political Economy, Reform, Africa 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Agriculture in Egypt has always played a central role in the economy of the country. At the end of the 
1990s, despite a continuous decline since the 1970s, the sector was still estimated to employ about one 
third of the national labour force and to contribute about 20% of Egypt’s GDP [1]. In comparison, 
fisheries and in particular the fishery of Lake Nasser is a very recent and relatively small economic 
activity. About 8000 fishers operate artisanal boats from the shores of the lake and the annual official 
landings, essentially supplying the domestic market, varies between 12,000 and 15,000 tons a year 
(LNDA unpublished data). Despite this relatively modest importance, and the difficulties faced by the 
government in implementing liberalisation and land reforms in the rest of the agricultural sector, the 
Egyptian authority decided to embark on a complete reform of the Lake Nasser fishery in the early 2000s.  
 
The objective of the present article is to analyze the evolution of this reform, using a political economy 
perspective. In particular, we will look retrospectively at the justification of the reform, describe the 
different institutional and economic changes that have (or have not) resulted from its realization, identify 
how the distribution of power between the different actors has altered the course of its implementation, 
and finally assess the outcomes (who have been the ‘losers’ and ‘winners’?) of the reform. Our research 
will show that the reform, which may at first sight be (mis)taken for another attempt of the Egyptian 
government to pursue the liberalization of the agricultural sector, has in fact very little to do with this 
agenda. Instead, the analysis suggests that the reform of the Lake Nasser fishery has been the result of a IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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combination of three converging ‘drivers’. First, the urgent need to respond to a ‘perceived’ 
environmental crisis where the resource was seen as being over-exploited; second, a despairing attempt to 
regain control over the management of the fishery, and third, the need to support the Egyptian national 
food subsidy programme that was at that time dismantled by the government under the pressure of the 
International Financial Institutions.      
 
CREATION OF THE LAKE NASSER FISHERY  
 
The Lake Nasser fishery started in 1961, with the construction in Aswan of the “High Dam”. The main 
objectives of the High Dam ‘pharaonic’ project were to regularize the flow of the Nile river, to store 
water, to provide resource for permanent irrigation and to produce electricity. Behind its structure, the 
High Dam created a gigantic man-made lake (the Lake Nasser) that spread across Upper Egypt and Sudan 
along 490 km, with an average width of 15 km. The long and narrow shape of the lake is composed of a 
main body, following the former riverbed, surrounded by 100 major creeks (khors) and numerous minor 
ones. This dendritic shape creates a shoreline stretching for as much as 7,800 km [2]. In fact, Lake Nasser 
presents more characteristics of an extremely slow flowing river than of a real lake. It is characterised by 
a high primary productivity due to the millions of tonnes of the Nile’s slits that slowly sediment in the 
southern part of the lake [3]. Rich in sediment and thus in food, the Lake supports an abundant fish 
population. Tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus) is the most common species and represents about 80% of the 
catches. In addition to tilapia, Nile perch (Lates niloticus), Tiger fish (Hydrocynus forskalii) and Alestes 
spp. are also important for the fishery [4]. While tilapia and Nile perch are landed fresh, Tiger fish and 
Alestes are usually processed by fishers before being sold as salted fish. 
 
The recorded yields of the fishery have varied considerably since the creation of the lake. In the first two 
years following the filling up of the lake, the production reached 1000 tonnes. Those were caught by a 
few hundred fishers operating from about 200 small boats [5]. Five years later, when the lake was still 
only half-full, 3,200 fishers were already catching 4,670 tonnes a year [6]. From then, the development of 
the fishery accelerated. The number of fishers tripled in a decade to reach about 8,000, and the landings 
reached a peak of 34,206 t in 1981. Following this, the landings then stagnated around 20,000 t for some 
years with very important variations that reflected changing water levels, but also social, economical and 
political factors. Official landings eventually reached an alarmingly low level at 8,281 t in 2000. Since 
then, annual landings remain low, far below the potential of the Lake, estimated to be between 50,000 and 
80,000 tonnes (LNDA unpublished data). 
 
STATE-CONTROLLED MANAGEMENT OF LAKE NASSER’S FISHERY: 1966-2001 
 
The central authority 
 
As soon as 1963, while the first stage of construction of the High Dam was about to be completed, the 
Governorate of Aswan established the Regional Planning Authority to cope with the changes created by 
the High Dam. In addition, in 1968, the Egyptian government invited the United Nation Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to establish the Lake Nasser 
Development Centre in order to assess the development potential of the new water-body and its 
surroundings. At the end of its mandate, in 1975, the Centre submitted a report with findings and 
recommendations about how to develop Lake Nasser regarding agriculture, fisheries, public health, 
settlement planning, tourism and transportation [7].  
 
In order to pursue and implement the work started by the UN, the Lake Nasser Development Authority 
(LNDA) was established 1975. It was made responsible for the overall development and utilization of the 
natural resources in the Lake Nasser region. This institution has played and is still currently playing a IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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crucial role in the development of the fishery. Over the years, NLDA has seen its prerogatives gradually 
extended up to the point to becoming the only governmental agency in charge of the fishery since 2001.  
 
The cooperatives 
 
Since the first years of existence of the Lake Nasser fishery, one cooperative (called “Mother 
Cooperative”) has been active. Mother Cooperative did not, strictly speaking, emerge from the will of 
individual fishers in order to facilitate their activities, increase their bargaining power or improve access 
to fishing inputs or services. In fact, far from comprising a homogenous and coherent social group, the 
majority of the individuals involved in the fishing activity are seasonal, unsettled, workers coming from 
different parts of the country to exploit the fishery with which they have no real historical (long-term) 
connection. Mother cooperative had therefore no vocation to neither federate, nor represent, these 
seasonal workers. Instead, its first duty was to link the fishing camps scattered around the lake with the 
harbour of Aswan. For this, it used to operate half a dozen large carrier boats that visited the fishing 
camps on a regular basis, providing fishers with food and other inputs and collecting their fish in return 
[8].  
 
In the early 1970s, the growing potential of the fishery rapidly attracted an increasing number of fishers 
from all part of Egypt. Along with the development of the fishery and its economic potential, interest for 
this new income opportunity steadily increased also amongst the local populations. In particular, the 
Nubians and people from Aswan Governorate suddenly developed an interest in fishing and wished to 
create their own cooperatives. In 1979, the Nubian Cooperative Society for Fishing (hereafter referred to 
as the “Nubian cooperative”) was established. Soon after, two other cooperatives were also created: 
Aswan’s Sons and el Takamol. 
  
In order to reduce the potential conflicts that the entry of these new actors may have created, a license 
system was introduced in the fishery. Originally, the ownership of fishing boat gave right to claim for a 
license, and boat/license owners were thus making the majority of the cooperative members. The number 
of licenses in each cooperative was used to calculate the portion of shoreline that each cooperative was to 
control. It is interesting to note that the division was based on the length of the shoreline, not on the 
surface of the lake -as the productivity of the lake is recognised to be more directly related to the 
shoreline length than to the area or volume of water. Initially licenses could be sold and/or exchanged. 
Some boat owners thus managed to acquire as many as 100 licenses. Recently new restrictions on renewal 
of licenses were introduced and the regulations have changed in an attempt to clamp down on the 
smuggling activity (see below). In particular, an upper limit of 3000 licenses has been fixed and those 
licenses cannot be sold or exchanged any longer.  
 
The fishers 
 
Fishers operate from temporary fishing camps established along the 7800 km of the lake’s shorelines. 
With no electricity, no running water and no access to public services, the living conditions in those 
remote camps are rough. Only male fishers live there, usually staying in rudimentary cane-made shelters 
for up to 7 months. Those fishers operate whether for a company or under the banner of a cooperative. 
The ones working for companies are labourers who receive money from their work, usually 
proportionally to their catch. Fishers working with a cooperative can either own their own license or use 
the license of another owner. Two contract systems allow this second type of arrangement: leasing and 
sharecropping. Under the leasing system, fishers pay a certain amount of money to the license owner and 
then manage their activity and their catch on their own. Sharecropping is more common. Under this 
system, fishers and license owners will share the profit of the catch, with usually half of which going to 
the owners. Owning licences can thus become very profitable. Nevertheless, small-scale activity is still 
widespread on the lake and approximately 50% of the license owners are actual fishers [8]. This IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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proportion greatly varies amongst cooperatives, though, with a large majority of license owners actually 
fishing being part of Mother cooperative, by far the biggest cooperative with about half of all the licenses.  
 
State owned companies and fixed price 
 
During the first years of the Lake Nasser fishery development, when Mother Cooperative was still the 
only cooperative collecting the fish from the fisher camps, a single state-owned company organised the 
marketing of the fish in Aswan. This company, the Egyptian Company for Fish Marketing (hereafter 
called Taswik), depended on the Ministry of Supply. At that time, the fishery, as well as the fisherfolk, 
were of little concern for the central government whose main interest was to provide the country with 
cheap protein [5]. The price of fish from Lake Nasser was therefore fixed at a very low level and the 
whole commercialisation process was under state control. The cooperatives collected the fish from fishers 
and delivered it to Taswik. The money they received from Taswik was later redistributed to the fishers 
and boat owners.  
 
In order to improve the marketing process, another company, Misr Aswan Fishery and Fish Processing 
Company (hereafter called Misr-Aswan), was established in 1979. This company did not depend on the 
Ministry of Supply as Taswik did. It had its shares held by a variety of different actors including the 
National Bank of Egypt, the A-Chark Insurance Company (affiliated to the Ministry of Investment), the 
New Urban Communities Authority (part of the Ministry of Housing, Utility and Urban Communities). It 
was thus clearly a second state-owned company but with wider functions and mandate than Taswik. Misr 
Aswan did not only bring fish to the national market but also had its own fishing activities and carried out 
some processing activities. Despite this wider range of activities, Misr Aswan did not have the large 
marketing infrastructure of Taswik and the government decided to institutionalize this difference in 
legally attributing 75% of the landings to Taswik and 25% to Misr Aswan. 
 
Declining catches 
 
As mentioned earlier, 1981 has marked a turning point in the evolution of the fishery. Not only the 
planning reorganisation that took place that year institutionalised a 5-fishing zone arrangement that was 
then to characterize the fishery for the next 20 years, but it is also the year where the landings reached its 
peak level at 34,206 t, never equalled since then. Over the following two decades, the yield diminished 
from 650 kg/boat/day to a mere 35 kg/boat/day. These diminishing quantities as well as decreasing sizes 
of captured fish were interpreted by many scientists as the sign of serious overexploitation of the resource 
[9, 10]. Two main factors could have played a crucial role in this decreasing trend.  
 
First, the natural factors, and in particular the varying water level of the lake directly depending on rain 
precipitation of the basin. Africa went through a particularly dry period over the 1970-1980 and the water 
level of Lake Nasser (like some other Sahelian Lake, e.g., Lake Chad) showed an overall decreasing trend 
over that period. This potentially affected the productivity of the khors whose total surface were 
drastically reduced. Second, the fishing effort. Even if the increase in number of fishers stopped from the 
beginning of the 1980s, the gradual organisation of the fishery made the resource prone to increasing 
fishing pressure. Indeed, during the first years of the exploitation of the fishery, only few large carrier 
boats were linking fishing boats with the harbour of Aswan. Due to the long distance between the fishing 
ground and the harbour, carrier boats were only collecting fish once a week. Unable to store their catch 
for more than two or three days without electricity (and therefore ice), fishers were only fishing during the 
days immediately preceding the arrival of the carrier boat. Latter on the development of new harbours 
(Abu Simbel and later Garf Husein) and the multiplications of carrier boats (190 nowadays) allowed 
fishers to have their catch brought to the market more regularly. This increased frequency of carrier boat 
collection led to an overall greater number of days of fishing, which probably increased pressure on fish 
population and might have contributed to overfishing [11].  IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Conservation measures 
 
Faced with decreasing landings, the management agencies introduced new measures to increase both the 
production and the productivity of the fishery. It was then proposed to control that each licensed boat was 
effectively operating and its catch was being recorded and not smuggled away. Production targets were 
set for each cooperative and a minimum threshold was fixed for each boat. The targets were set by 
estimating the expected production of the whole fishery, and then divided between the four cooperatives 
and Misr-Aswan according to the number of boats each operated.  
 
In addition to the license control, a closed period was also introduced in an attempt to release the pressure 
over the resource. Initially the closed season was supposed to last for 2 to 3 months, but right after the 
measure had been adopted, loud complaints from the cooperatives led the administration to reduce the 
closed season to one month only. The argument was that preventing fisherfolk to fish would have severe 
socio-economic consequences. Following additional protest the closed season was brought down to a 
mere two weeks, making it virtually totally ineffective. It has only recently been re-established to one 
month again. Finally, LNDA also introduced legal size limitation for the catch. For each fisher’s landing 
load, a maximum of 10% of undersized fish (e.g. 500 g for tilapia) was tolerated. If the proportion of 
undersized fish was higher than the 10% limit, the whole fisher’s catch was confiscated.  
 
Explaining the magnitude of smuggling 
 
While the price of fish in Egypt was already free in the 1980s, the government continued to maintain a 
fixed price for Lake Nasser landings. This exception was officially justified by the recent history of the 
lake: whereas other lakes and coastlines in Egypt had been supporting long-established fishing 
communities, Lake Nasser was not hosting any permanent fishing population but only newly established 
seasonal fishers. This particular situation, it was argued, was a good reason for the central authority to 
control the fishery, with no other (social) consideration than maximising the supply of cheap fish to the 
rest of the country.  
 
Albeit having increased over time (passing for instance from EGP 0.64 to EGP 1.05 per kg between 1988 
and 1990), the fixed price was still far below the free national market at that time. This situation gave 
both fishers and traders a very good incentive to engage in a parallel black market whereby an increasing 
quantity of fish was diverted from the official channels. Secretly landed in isolated creeks at night, these 
fish were loaded on trucks and sold directly on the urban markets of Cairo and other main towns of the 
country. Smuggling fish traders could offer a better price (than the fixed price) to the fishers and still 
make profit as the difference between the lake harbours price and the national Souk el Abour market was 
substantial.  
 
In addition to higher price, smuggling also allowed fishers to evade some of the constraining government 
regulations. For instance, the government levied taxes on the official market to finance the development 
of the fishery, the management of the harbours and the social security system for the workers. These taxes 
may not be prohibitive but still contributed to make smuggling more profitable than official business. 
More importantly, smuggling offers the possibility to circumvent the stringent resource conservation 
regulations put in place by the government. When the proportion of the undersize catch was greater than 
the minimum 10% limit, the black market offered the fishers the opportunity to trade their catch without 
the risk of losing the whole load.  
 
In addition to fixed price and government regulations, another major reason that made smuggling a 
widely practiced activity was the bad management and efficiency of the state owned companies. Albeit 
enjoying a complete monopoly for years in the marketing sector with low buying price, higher selling IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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price and reasonable transportation, processing and marketing costs, their bad management led the state-
owned companies to constantly face financial difficulties. Their numerous and inefficient administration 
absorbed an important part of their income and, because of managerial inefficiencies, important quantities 
of the fish were being wasted. By 2000, the two companies together had accumulated a debt of EGP 2.5 
millions towards the cooperatives from which they were buying fish. This failure of payment in turn had 
repercussion on the cooperatives that could no longer implement some of their activities and duties. They 
gradually abandoned most of their functions and eventually even stopped having the monopoly on 
transporting fish to the harbour as they could no longer operate all their carrier boats.  
 
Finally, while smuggling to avoid low price or state regulations was mainly motivated by the expectation 
of higher profits, some situation of failure of payment also encouraged fishers to accept to smuggle even 
at very low price, as cooperatives were known to have a tendency to fail to pay for the fish they handled. 
In these cases, fishers had no choice but to turn to the black market to try to get a minimum remuneration 
for their catch.  
 
Besides this endured or chosen smuggling, the problem of failure of payment destroyed the fishery 
further, from a relational and social point of view. It led fishers to deeply mistrust the public companies 
and the cooperatives they belonged to. Mistrust also emerged as the state-owned companies tended to 
demonstrate bad business practices. It has been reported that those companies tended not to pay for the 
fish being delivered to them, arguing on its quality and relying on corrupted officials sided with them. 
These practices are however no longer possible as the new organisation of the harbour prevents these 
companies, particularly Taswik, to directly deal with the fishers operating in their respective sector. The 
mistrust toward cooperative and state companies can, on a morality perspective, be seen as an additional 
justification for smuggling: unfairly treated fishers would feel no moral obligation to deal on an honest 
basis with a trading partner who had on several occasions in the past mistreated them.  
 
Another major factor that has contributed to the magnitude of the smuggling is that the Lake Nasser 
fishery -like a large number of artisanal fisheries in the developing world- has been attracting an 
increasing number of poor people from all over the country. In Egypt where Nasser’s land reform has 
been progressively dismantled by several series of counter-reforms, it is estimated that about 75% of the 
small tenants have been forced to leave the agricultural sector in the last 10 years [12]. In those 
conditions, the Lake Nasser fishery plays a substantial role as ‘labour buffer’ for many poor or landless 
fellahins who rely on the fishery as a safety net activity. As a result, many illegal unlicensed fishers (who 
cannot land their catch through the official system) are now operating in the fishery. Those are estimated 
to be about 3000.  
 
Finally, the form of ownership of the fishing rights and the nature of the labour arrangements also 
encouraged registered fishers to smuggle. We saw that the boat-owners had good incentives to hide some 
of their production to the cooperatives (due to the cooperative corruption and their frequent failure to pay 
their dues). The labourers operating under a sharecropping system have also good reasons to engage in 
smuggling. For those labourers, even a price much below the free market level often left them better off 
that the remuneration they obtain through the share cropping system. 
 
In short, many actors are facing various, sometimes additive or complementary, reasons to support and 
participate to black market activity. Additionally, the fact that smuggling benefits actors on both side of 
the trade equation (fishers and fish traders) makes the whole cycle even less likely to break off. 
 
Fighting smuggling 
 
LNDA, in collaboration with the aquatic police, the federal police and the Governorate of Aswan, have 
been trying to fight against the smuggling sector. This turned out to be a very difficult task. The lake has IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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thousands of kilometres of inhabited shoreline and is surrounded by desert, making it almost totally 
impossible to control. In addition, smugglers are well organized and have good networks that allow them 
to be always ahead of the authorities. Even when those are caught, NLDA can just confiscate the 
smugglers’ vehicles, boats or illegal gears for about a year. The case is usually submitted to local court, 
and the smugglers get their properties back within weeks [13]. 
 
The statistics are impressive. The police and NDLA arrested, in 2006 alone, as many as 357 trucks filled 
with smuggled fish, that is, more than one truck a day if we account for the fishery closed season. This 
statistic gives an idea of the intensity of the smuggling, and of the large economic and institutional forces 
that create it. In effect, fish smuggling does not involve only poor fishers but also a substantial number of 
better-off fish traders. It is a ‘big business’ and many actors in the sector would agree that it has become 
almost a formal activity.  
 
LIBERALIZATION OF THE FISHERY: 2001-PRESENT 
 
Privatization of the fishery as the ‘solution’ 
 
After recorded landings fell to a catastrophic level of only 8,281 t in 2000, a commission representing the 
shareholders involved in the management of the fishery was called in 2001 to address the alarming 
situation of the Lake’s fishery. The commission identified overfishing, rather than environmental change, 
as the main cause of the fishery poor performances [10]. This overfishing was reported to be closely 
related with smuggling and mismanagement of the resource. In turn, smuggling was diagnosed to result 
from price control. To overcome these two major defects, the commission recommended liberalizing the 
fishery. Through this liberalization, the whole lake resources were to be allocated to “investment 
companies” that would take over the entire productive chain, from fishing to marketing. Privatising the 
resource exploitation, it was thought, would make the players more responsible for their share of the 
resource and therefore provide them with incentives not to deplete their ‘own capital’. In addition to this 
basic economic principle, the move towards the liberalisation of the fishery was meant to deregulate the 
price and improve the management of the sector. In turn, this would curb smuggling and reinstate some 
control over the fishery. 
 
The commission’s report also included other recommendations. In particular, in order to increase the 
productivity of the lake, the report called for increased public and private investment and encouraged the 
development of enclosures in the khors. The commission also suggested to strengthen control over the 
Lake and to toughen penalties. On the institutional point of view, it recommended to streamline the 
fishery management by unifying the activities of the two departments of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Land Reclamation managing the fishery, with the result of transferring most of the duties to LNDA.  
 
Liberalisation process 
 
Twenty-one bids by different private investors were received but, while the selection process was still 
ongoing, the cooperatives warned against potentially severe socio-economic troubles if they were to 
disappear through this liberalization reform. Eventually, after a few months of a rather un-transparent 
process, the selection procedure was closed. The cooperatives managed to maintain most of their existing 
privileges. They ended up with as much as 60% of the lake allocated free to them. The investment 
companies were thus left with a mere 40% of the Lake’s surface. Moreover, the private companies only 
received a very small fraction (6%) of the very productive khors areas. This new repartition, by attributing 
on average 85% of the shares of the investment companies to open waters, was meant to incite these 
private companies to deploy fishing activities in the so-far underexploited open waters. The cooperatives 
had always neglected these less productive areas and the two state-owned companies had made it clear 
that they would not be able to operate there. Another category of actor was therefore necessary if the IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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potential of the Lake was to be fully developed. The position of the central authority was based on the 
assumption that good fishing potentials exist in the open waters, but investment is needed before these 
areas can become profitable. Investment companies were therefore viewed as the only actors that could 
make the necessary efforts (and bear the risks…).  
 
In order to ‘incite’ those investment companies and provide them with enough fish to make marketing 
profitable, a compensation measure was also introduced. While the companies could only fish on a small 
fraction of the shorelines, they were entitled to get a part of the landings of the cooperatives. Thus, 
investment companies were ‘offered’ the right to process 58% of the cooperatives landing on their sector. 
The two state companies Taswik and Misr Aswan, on the other hand, kept the monopoly of their 
respective sectors and were entitled to process the whole production in those sectors. 
 
Current actors and allocation of fishing rights 
 
Out of the 21 bids proposed, a selection committee selected six companies after thoroughly examining 
their business plan, technical expertise and security plans. Not surprisingly, the two state-owned 
companies, Taswik and Misr Aswan, were both amongst the list of 6 ‘winners’. It was said that despite 
their relative low efficiency, these companies had to be chosen “as they were already active in the 
fishery”.  
 
Taswik and Misr Aswan, tend however to suffer from severe mis-management and since the exploitation 
has been opened to private companies, the hard competition has forced them to improve their practices 
and organisation. Misr Aswan, for example, reduced considerably its administration but has failed to keep 
its infrastructure operational. In fact, even under the new system, these two companies are perceived to do 
very little, except continuing to benefit for the monopoly over the processing of the fish caught in their 
sector.  
 
The cooperatives have also tried to improve their management and practices. Through rationalisation, 
Mother Cooperative managed to reduce its administrative staff tenfold within a few years and other 
cooperatives have gone through the same process. Most fishers however still mistrust the cooperatives, in 
particular Mother Cooperative, and the election of the board are usually characterised by indifference 
even by the members. Their financing nowadays principally comes from a tax of 6 piaster (100 piasters = 
EGP 1) levied on each kilo of fish landed. There are growing complaints amongst fishers as the revenues 
generated through this tax is used, or at least perceived to be used, to cover mainly the board and the 
administrative costs with little redistribution or benefits to the fishers.  
 
Price deregulation and neo-centralism 
 
In 2001, following the recommendations of the commission, an initial attempt to liberalise the fish price 
at the harbours was made. Auctions were free and many traders were tensely competing to obtain their 
part of the landing. Unfortunately, the ‘free forces’ of the market did not drive the new system in the 
expected direction. As the competition became intense, the traders progressively started to use 
increasingly aggressive methods. Some days, the price of large tilapia went above EGP 30 per kg, far 
higher than the national price. This exacerbated and irrational competition led to unfair practices where 
for instance some buyers were pushing the price up to unaffordable levels before withdrawing from the 
auction, leaving the fish unsold. The whole system failed to move rapidly towards efficiency. After a few 
months, in order to bring the situation back into control, it was decided to discontinue the free market 
process: fish price would not be determined by auction at the harbour any longer, but would, instead, be 
determined fortnightly by a committee created especially for this purpose.  
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Price ceiling was not the only regulation (re)introduced by the central authority after the failure of the 
2001 free-pricing experiment. Attracted by the market opportunities, many traders entered the sector in 
the course of the 1990s. However, in order to pay off transportation costs to the national fish market of 
Souk el Abour, more than 630 km away from Aswan, each trader needs a minimum of 2.5 t of fish per 
trip. Somehow, it was feared that the local market would not be able to internalize this costs and that, 
once again, the government should intervene. Thus, everyday, only one private trader (following a 
rotating system amongst the 6 traders officially associated to each harbour) is entitled to buy a share of 
the cooperative’s landings, alongside with the investment companies and the state-owned companies. The 
other five fish traders have the choice: wait for their turn, or join the horde of smuggling traders who 
operate from non-official landing sites along the lake shores. 
 
Today, fresh fish landings are low again -around 20% of the potential production. Overfishing, of course, 
may be one cause for this poor performance, as the resource is said to be under stress. But the re-
emergence of smuggling cannot be ignored. It is currently estimated that official landings probably 
represent only half of the total catch. With a heavily controlled price and a limited entry through a fixed 
number of licenses, smuggling remains a major problem for the fishery. In addition, the mistrust and 
refusal to deal with the two state-owned companies remains acute amongst fishers and a good incentive 
for those operating in their sectors to use black-market channels instead of the company landing facilities.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The decision to liberalise Lake Nasser’s fishery was made in 2001 following a 20-year decline in the 
official landings. Liberalisation was in fact perceived as the necessary response to an environmental crisis 
combined to an economic problem. From the environmental side, overfishing had been identified as the 
main threat to the resource and, as a response, the commission proposed to privatise the resource. The 
basic principle was to try to avoid the classical “tragedy of the commons” by privatizing the resource 
[14], thus giving incentives to the main stakeholders to responsibly and sustainably manage ‘their’ own 
resource. From the economic side, with massive amounts of fish diverted from the official 
commercialisation channels by the smugglers, liberalization was viewed as a way to incite soundly 
managed private companies to take over the whole business and transform the fishery into an 
economically efficient sector. Indeed, with quite powerful parastatal agencies enjoying an exclusive 
control over the resource, refusing to pay for it and poorly managing it, the government recognised that 
liberalisation was a possible solution to solve many of the economic inefficiencies of the system.  
 
As our analysis reveals, however, the existing parastatal agencies –although economically inefficient - 
were politically powerful enough to oppose the radical reshaping of the fishery. As a result, the 
government had to modify or even to drop some parts of its original plan, and eventually invited only four 
private companies to participate in the new development plan.  
 
Additional elements, however, should also be considered when one tries to explain the decision of the 
authorities to downplay the fishery reform. As far as the particular treatment enjoyed by the state-owned 
companies is concerned, there is little doubt that their close links with many different ministries and 
central authorities has been a major element in this process, confirming a posteriori some of the fishers’ 
allegations. It is possible, therefore –as it is still the case in many other developing countries- that 
cronyism and nepotism might have been amongst the key-factors that ‘shaped’ the reform and led it to its 
current “neo-centralised” form.  
 
Another explanation -which complements the cronyism hypothesis above, rather than replace it- is one 
that links the Lake Nasser ‘liberalization’ reform to the Egyptian national food subsidy programme that 
had been implemented in the country since World War II. To explore this hypothesis, let us first recall 
that the objective of the Lake Nasser fishery programme as it had been defined in the early phase of its IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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development planning was that of production of cheap animal protein. This objective appears in fact in 
direct line with the nation-wide food subsidy programme that was being pursued at that time in Egypt. 
Since WWII, a food rationing system had been put in place in order to provide certain necessities to 
consumers at relatively low prices. Initially focussing on edible oil, sugar, tea, and kerosene, the 
programme was extended in the 1950s and 1960s to include beans, lentils, frozen fish and meat, and 
chicken. By the end of the 1970s, almost 20 food commodities were being heavily subsidized [15]. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, internal budgetary and International Financial Institutions’ pressures forced 
the central authority to considerably ‘rationalize’ the programme. Most of the food items that had been 
added in the 1960s and 1970s were gradually removed from the programme, and at present only four food 
items remain subsidized –one type of bread, wheat flour, edible oil and sugar [16].  
 
In this context, the Lake Nasser fishery offered a great opportunity to the government to ‘compensate’ for 
the downsizing of the food subsidy programme, at least as far as animal protein is concerned. Several 
economically unorthodox decisions taken by the central authority only make sense when re-interpreted 
under this hypothesis. The introduction of the rotating trading system, for instance, whereby one trader 
only is allowed to purchase the landings every day is a good example. The monopsonic conditions created 
by this particular system ensures that the price at which the landed fish is purchased remains artificially 
low, thus compensating for the high transportation costs between Lake Nasser to the different national 
markets and reducing the risks that these costs are reported onto the consumers.  
 
The reintroduction of the fixed-price system after the failure of the local market free pricing experience in 
2001 is another example. Indeed, while the market had failed to organise itself rapidly, it could be argued 
that some institutional support or a better enforcement of the rules would have been sufficient to generate 
a free and efficient fish market system in the fishery. Instead, the central authorities decided to revert 
quickly to a fixed price system, which goes against the most basic economic principle. It seems difficult 
to explain such decision, unless, of course, the real objective of the operation was to keep the fish price 
artificially low. 
 
All these market distortions eventually created enough space for a massive black market to develop. 
Today it is estimated that about half of the current production of the lake (probably 15,000 t) is smuggled 
every year. Sarcastically, while the authorities are actively fighting the smuggling, it might be argued that 
the black market does constitute an indirect food subsidy programme. Indeed, there is no doubt that the 
myriad of smugglers (licensed and not-licensed fishers, traders and other intermediates) that extract and 
trade thousands of tonnes of fish every year at a price below the national market’s price and deliver those 
to the rest of the country’s market places, do contribute, indirectly, to the supply of ‘subsidized’ animal 
protein. Of course many would retort that allowing existing (and possibly additional) private companies 
to properly invest and develop an economically efficient market chain would be a more appropriate 
manner to ensure this to happen, as theory claims that perfect markets eventually allocate resources in the 
most efficient manner.  
 
Whether those private investment companies, supported by a true free-market policy environment, would 
indeed ensure a more efficient provision of cheapest fish than the current black market is difficult to 
determine. What is certain, however, is that the cheap supply of Lake Nasser fish is not currently 
‘subsidized’ by the central government but by the primary stakeholders of the fishery. The fishers are 
indeed these who are bearing the social and economic costs of the distorted fish price mechanisms put in 
place by the authorities, for the greatest benefit of the rest of the society. As such, they are indisputably 
the main losers of this whole ‘liberalization’ reform. 
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